I introduce a temporal belief-network rep resentation of causal independence that a knowledge engineer can use to elicit proba bilistic models. Like the current, atempo ral belief-network representation of causal in dependence, the new representation makes knowledge acquisition tractable. Unlike the atemproal representation, however, the tem poral representation can simplify inference, and does not require the use of unobservable variables. The representation is less gener al than is the atemporal representation, but appears to be useful for many practical ap plications.
INTRODUCTION
When modeling the real world, we often encounter sit uations in which multiple causes bear on a single effect. A typical interaction of this sort can be modeled with the belief network shown in Figure 1 . In the figure, the variable e represents an effect and the variables c 1 , ... , e n represent n causes of that effect: This rep resentation is inadequate, because it fails to represen t the independence of causal interactions-or causal independence-that so often applies in this situation. Consequently, the representation imposes intractable demands on both knowledge acquisition and inference.
To overcome this inadequacy, knowledge engineer s have used belief networks of the form shown in Figure 2 to represent causal independence (Kim and Pearl, 1983; Henrion, 1987; Srinivas, 1992) . As in Figure 1 , the variables c1, ... , e n , and e represent the causes and effect, respectively. In addition, the inter mediate variables i1, ... , i n represent the independent contributions of each cause on the effect. That is, the effect e is some deterministic function of these inter mediate variables. This belief network encodes causal independence via the absence of arcs between pairs of i variables and via the absence of any arc between a c and i variable. As a result, this representation avoid- Like the representation in Figure 1 , however, this rep resentation leads to intractable inference computation s. In addition, the representation introduces a difficul ty not present in the naive representation of multi ple causes shown in Figure 1 : The variables i1, . . . , i n are not observable. In my experience, assessments are easier to elicit (and presumably more reliable) when a person makes them in terms of observable variables.
In this paper, we examine a definition of causal inde pendence that explicitly involves temporal considera tions. From this definition, we derive a belief-network representation of causal independence. The represen tation facilitates tractable inference, and does not re quire the use of unobservable variables. Under these assumptions, we can define causal inde pendence to be the set of conditional-independent as sertions w t _.; (
where (X ..l YJZ) denotes the conditional independence assertion "the sets of variables X and Y are independent, given Z." Note that Assertion 1 is somewhat unusual, in that independence in condi tioned, in part, on t}le knowledge that the instances of variables are equal, but otherwise undetermined (cf = c;+t for k f:. j). In words, Assertion 1 states that if cause d makes a transition from one instance to another between t and t + 1, and if no other causes makes a transition during this time interval, then the probability distribution over the effect at time t + 1 depends only on the state of the effect at time t and on the transition made by d; the distribution does not depend on the other causation variables.
As mentioned in the previous section, we can derive a belief-network representation of causal independence from this definition. First, for each cause, designate some instance of its associated variables to be distin guished. For most real-world models, this instance will represent the state of the cause in which that cause has no bearing on the effect-that is, the "off'' state-but we do not require this association. Second, construc t a belief network consisting of nodes c 1 , ... , cf1', and eo, ... , e n , as shown in Figure 3 . In this belief net work, node e0 represents the effect when all causes take on their distinguished instance. Node c 1 repre sents the state of cause c 1 after it has made a transi tion from its distinguished instance (a transition may be the trivial transition, wherein the cause maintain s its distinguished instance). Node e 1 represents the effect after only c 1 has made the transition. In gen eral, node d represents the state of cause d after it has made a (possibly trivial) transition from its distin guished instance. Node ej represents the effect after causes c 1 , ... , d have made their transitions. In par ticular, node e n represents the effect after all causes have made transitions. Thus, node e n corresponds to node e in the atemporal representation of causal inde pendence (Figure 2 ).
The conditional independencies represented in the be lief network of Figure 3 follow from the temporal def inition of casual independence. The belief network, however, does not encode all of the conditional inde pendencies associated with the definition. For exam ple, from the temporal definition, we can obtain a be lief network identical to the one in Figure 3 , except for the exchange of nodes d and ej with c k and e k , respectively (for any j f:. k); we cannot obtain such a belief network directly from the belief network in Figure 3 . Nonetheless, this belief-network represen tation of causal independence retains most of the ad vantages of the temporal definition. In particular, (1) probability assessment is tractable, (2) if we use any of the standard belief-network inference algorithms (e.g., Shachter (1986) , Pearl (1985) , or Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter ( 1988) ), then inference is tractable, and (3) all probability assessments in this representation involve observable variables. The atemporal belief network representation of causal independence does not have the latter two advantages.
Let us illustrate this representation with two exam ples. First, consider the most commonly used form of causal independence: the noisy OR-gate (Good, 1961; Suppes, 1970; Habbema, 1976; Kim and Pearl, 1983) . This model, expressed in the atemporal representa tion of causal independence, consists of binary vari ables c 1 , ... , e n , i 1 , ... , i n , and e (i.e., each variable has "true " and "false" as its only instances). Also, we require !( ·1 ·n) ·1
· n t , ... ,t =t v ... Vt and p(ii = trueld =false)= 0 (2) for j =' 1, ... , n. The adjustable parameters of the model are the probabilitieey
Finally, to allow for the possibility that e is true when all causes are absent-sometimes called a "leak " (Hen rion, 1987)-we add a variable c0 to the belief network in Figure 2 , and instantiate c0 to true.
The noisy OR-gate, expressed in the temporal belief network representation consists of binary variables c 1 , ... , e n , and eo, ... , en. The variable en in this belief network corresponds to the variable e in the atempo ral representation. The distinguished instances of the variables d are the instances "false. . The prob ability p( eo = true) corresponds to the leak probability q 0 in the atemporal representation.
As mentioned, the advantages of the temporal representation are twofold. First, most infer ence computations-for example, the computation of p(c1le = true)-using standard belief-network al gorithms have time complexity CJ(n) in the tem poral representation, but CJ(2 n ) in the at€mporal representation. 1 Second, the temporal representation requires probability assessments involving only observ able variables. In contrast, the atemporal representa tion requires the assessments p(ii = trueld = true), where the ii are unobservable variables.
Let us consider another model of a common cause and-effect interaction: the noisy adder. This model, expressed in the a temporal representation of causal in dependence, consists of binary variables c1, ... , e n , and integer-valued variables i 1 , ... , i n . Each ii can take on values ranging from -l to +l. Also, we require f( ·1 · n ) ·1
• n t , ... ,t =t + ... +t and p(ii =Old= false)= 1 (4) for i 1, ... , n. The adjustable parameters of the model are the probabilities p(ii =kid =true) = qik (5)
for the noisy OR-gate interaction. The temporal represen tation eliminates the need for this special-case algorithm.
To allow for a leak, we add a variable c0 to the belief network in Figure 2 , and instantiate c0 to true. Note that e can take on values ranging from -(n + 1)l to +(n + 1)l.
The noisy adder, expressed in the temporal representa tion consists of binary variables c 1 , ... , e n , and integer valued variables eo, ... , en = e. The distinguished in stances of the variables d are the instances "false. Note that the values of variable e1 range from -(j + 1 )l to +(j + 1 )l. Consequently, inference using any stan dard belief-network algorithm has computational com plexity CJ(n3l2), a signifi cant improvement over the intractable computations dictated by the atemporal representation. 2
A REAL-WORLD EXAMPLE
Although the computational benefits of the temporal belief-network representation of causal independence are substantial, the new representation was inspired by the fact that it does not require probability as sessments over unobservable variables. In particular, while I was developing a normative expert system for the morphologic diagnosis of blood disorders with the expert hematopathologist Patrick Ward, we encoun tered an interesting interaction between the possible diseases of the blood, a patient's white-blood-cell (W BC) count, and various drugs that the patient may be taking as treatments for nonblood diseases. We attempted to model the interaction as a noisy adder, using the atemporal representation of causal indepen dence, as shown in Figure 4 (a). The pathologist did not understand clearly the definition of the intermedi ate variables, and could not provide the assessments required by the model. When I developed the alter native representation, and explained the probability ass essments in terms of the belief network shown in Figure 4 (b), the pathologist provided the assessments without difficulty. 
INFERENCE
As we discussed, the temporal belief-network repre sentation does not represent all of the conditional in dependencies corresponding to the temporal definition of causal independence. In particular, the representa tion imposes a particular ordering over the causation variables. This order specification does not appear to impose limitations on knowledge acquisition, but situ ations may arise wherein this order specification may make inference inefficient. For example, suppose we know that the blood-disorder system described in the previous section is going to process a series of cases in which only the variables WBC, DRUG 2 , and DRUG7 will be instantiated. We would like the inference al gorithm to recognize the irrelevance of the order of the causation variables, and rearrange the variables in the belief network so as to increase the efficiency of inference. In particular, the algorithm can rear range the variables so that DRUG 2 , WBC 2 , DRUG7, and WBC1 =WBC appear last in the chain. Conse quently, for the entire series of cases, the algorithm need sum over the other drug and WBC variables on ly once.
To accomplish this goal, we can transform the belief network in Figure 4 (b) to that in Figure 5 . In partic ular, we reintroduce intermediate variables, and make the addition function explicit, using deterministic vari ables. This transformation can be done algorithmi- Figure 5 : A modified version of the belief network in Figure 4 . An inference algorithm may be able to use the additional information in this belief network to increase the efficiency of inference.
cally. Recognizing that addition is commutative, the inference algorithm now can rearrange WBCi-DRUGi variable pairs so as to increase the efficiency of infer ence. 
Roughly speaking, two situations cause belief-network inference to become intractable: (1) a large parent set for one or more nodes, and (2) undirected cycles in the belief network. The use of the temporal repre sentation for causal independence eliminates the first problem in many situations, but does not eliminate the second problem. To understand this point, con sider the belief network shown in Figure 6 (a), wherein n causes bear on two effects a and b. The transfor mation to the temporal representation of this situa tion, shown in Figure 6 (b), does not eliminate undi rected cycles. For example, Figure 6 (b) contains the undirected cycle b1-c1-a1-a2-c2-b2-b1. Conse quently, the transformation does not produce tractable inference.
AN OB SERVATION ABOUT

GENERA LITY
The model in Figure 5 is a special case of the atempo ral representation of causal independence, where the function f is a nested series of added terms. Indeed, if we make the variables ij and function f suf ficiently complex, then any interaction encoded using the temporal belief-network representation of causal independence can be encoded using the atemporal rep resentation of causal independence.
Despite its less general nature, however, the temporal representation appears to be useful for many practical applications. Over the last decade, I have participated in the construction of dozens of normative expert sys tems. I have reexamined the belief networks for these systems, and have found many instances in which the use of the temporal representation described in this paper would have simplified knowledge acquisition and inference. The added generality of the atemporal mod el would not have been useful in any of these instances.
